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I. INTRODUCTION
Total software exports from the U.S. averaged approximately $3
billion per year from 1998 to 2002, making foreign software sales big
business.1 Companies commonly export their software using golden
master disks, which foreign purchasers use to generate the number of
software copies they need.2 U.S. companies, however, had been oper-
ating under uncertain conditions regarding their potential liability for
patent infringement arising from the exportation of software on
golden master disks. Generally, liability for patent infringement is
limited to activities that occur within the territorial jurisdiction of the
U.S., but section 271(f) of the Patent Act is an exception. 3 Section
271(f) makes any exporter liable for patent infringement for
"suppl[ying] ... from the United States... components of a patented
invention."4 For software distributed to foreign buyers using golden
master disks, it was not clear, until a recent Supreme Court decision,
whether section 271(f) imposed liability when the exported software
was used to create an invention protected by a U.S. patent in a foreign
country. The issue of patent infringement liability for exported
1. ECON. & STATISTICS ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, DIGITAL ECONOMY, 37
tbl.3.1 (2003), available at http://www.esa.doc.gov/reports/DE-Chap3.pdf; see also
J. Thomas McCarthy, Intellectual Property-America's Overlooked Export, 20 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 809, 813 (1995) (noting that "America supplies the bulk of the
world's software"); Paul Andrews, Microsoft's Monopoly Under Siege, SEATTLE
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2003, at C1 (observing that foreign software sales have been
integral in Microsoft's success).
2. A golden master disk is a CD-ROM encoded with software. It is to be used as a
template to generate copies of the software on additional CD-ROMs for installa-
tion on computers. See Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746, 1761
(2007); Eolas Technologies Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1331 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
3. See Virginia Zaunbrecher, Eolas, AT & T, & Union Carbide: The New Extraterri-
toriality of U.S. Patent Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 33 (2006).
4. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2000).
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software generally arose as follows: (1) a U.S-based company exported
software to a foreign buyer on a golden master disk, (2) the foreign
buyer copied the software code onto computer-readable disks using
the golden master disk, (3) the foreign buyer used the foreign-made
copies to install the software code onto computers for sale outside the
U.S., (4) the resulting computer and software combination potentially
infringed on a U.S. patent, and (5) the U.S. patent holder brought suit
against the U.S.-based company for patent infringement under section
271(f).5 With over 230,000 software-related U.S. patents, 6 software
exporters could potentially be held liable for actions of foreign buyers
outside the U.S. In its 2007 decision in Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T
Corp., the Supreme Court held that section 271(f) did not impose pat-
ent infringement liability on U.S. suppliers that export software from
the U.S. on golden master disks.
7
Section 271(f) is an exception to the presumption against extrater-
ritoriality prevalent in patent law. The presumption provides that lia-
bility for patent infringement is limited to activities that occur within
the U.S.8 Congress enacted the section in response to a loophole ex-
posed by Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.9 Deepsouth in-
volved a U.S.-based exporter that had escaped patent infringement
liability by exporting all the parts of a patented mechanical invention
in separate boxes for assembly and sale exclusively outside of the
U.S.1o If the exporter had first fully assembled the patented invention
within the U.S. before export, the exporter would have been liable for
patent infringement. Similarly, U.S. companies that create a pat-
ented invention involving software within the U.S. and then export
that invention would also be liable for patent infringement. 11
Courts routinely applied section 271(f) to exported parts of pat-
ented mechanical inventions,12 but did not generally apply the section
to exported software that could be used to create a patented inven-
tion.13 This changed in 2005 with AT & T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp. in
which the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals found a company that ex-
ported software on golden master disks liable for patent infringement
under section 271(f). 14 That decision exposed software exporters to
5. Microsoft Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746.
6. Mari-Len De Guzman, Patent War Looms, 23 COMPUTERWORLD CAN. (2007),
available at 2007 WLNR 12476396.
7. Id.
8. See Zaunbrecher, supra note 3, at 33.
9. 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
10. Id.
11. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).
12. Alan M. Fisch & Brent H. Allen, The Application of Patent Law to Exported
Software: 35 U.S.C. § 271(t), 25 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 557, 567-73 (2004).
13. See, e.g., Enpat, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 6 F. Supp. 2d 537 (E.D. Va. 1998) (finding
that section 271(f) did not apply to sales of software outside of the U.S.).
14. 414 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007).
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unexpected potential liability. However, the decision did not stand
long. The Federal Circuit's decision was reversed by the Supreme
Court two years later in Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp. 15 The Court
based its decision primarily on its interpretation of section 271(f), but
it also emphasized that the presumption against extraterritoriality in
U.S. patent law encouraged reversal.' 6 This decision clarified that
section 271(f), in its current form, had limited applicability to software
exports and left it to Congress to determine whether to create patent
infringement liability for software exported on golden master disks.17
Although such legislation would provide additional protection for U.S.
patent holders, Congress should not enact legislation imposing patent
infringement liability because the presumption against extraterritori-
ality counsels against it, U.S. software exporters could face excessive
liability, and U.S. patent holders can pursue protection in the foreign
countries where their patented inventions are likely to be sold.
This Note addresses whether Congress should impose patent in-
fringement liability on U.S. companies that export software on golden
master disks when the software is used to make and sell a U.S. pat-
ented invention in foreign countries. Part II of this Note focuses on
the significant role of the presumption against extraterritoriality in
statutory interpretation, the history of section 271(f) along with a dis-
cussion of the application of the section to software exports by the Fed-
eral Circuit, and the Supreme Court's opinion in Microsoft Corp. v. AT
& T Corp. Part III discusses why Congress should maintain section
271(f) in its current form and not expand it to impose liability for
software exported on golden master disks. Finally, Part IV of this
Note concludes that Congress should not respond to Microsoft Corp. v.
AT & T Corp. as it did to Deepsouth.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Role of the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
in Statutory Interpretation
1. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Applied to
Congressional Legislation
When interpreting Congressional legislation, courts generally ap-
ply a presumption against extraterritoriality.1 8 The presumption is
15. 127 S. Ct. 1746.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 388-89 (2005); Foley Bros., Inc. v.
Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949); United States v. Delgado-Garcia, 374 F.3d
1337, 1344 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Reyes-Gaona v. N.C. Growers Ass'n, 250 F.3d 861,
864-65 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v. Gatlin, 216 F.3d 207, 211-12 (2d Cir.
2000); Nieman v. Dryclean U.S.A. Franchise Co., 178 F.3d 1126, 1129 (11th Cir.
1999).
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that the legislation applies only within the territorial jurisdiction of
the U.S.; however, Congress can overcome this presumption by plainly
indicating a contrary intent.t 9 Courts apply the presumption for a
couple of key reasons. First, it is a way to avoid the "international
discord" that could result from "unintended clashes between our laws
and those of other nations."20 Second, under the doctrine of comity, it
is a recognition of the interests of other nations.2 1 The Supreme Court
has defined comity in the following manner:
'Comity,' in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on
the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, ex-
ecutive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to interna-
tional duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other
persons who are under the protection of its laws.
2 2
Courts, therefore, generally apply the presumption against extraterri-
toriality to avoid an unintended statutory interpretation that could
conflict with other nations' laws or disregard the interests of other
nations.
2. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Applied to U.S.
Patent Law
U.S. patent law flows from the U.S. Constitution. 23 The Constitu-
tion authorizes Congress to "promote the Progress of Science and use-
ful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
19. See, e.g., Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285; Carnero v. Boston Scientific Corp., 433 F.3d
1, 7 (1st Cir. 2006); Gatlin, 216 F.3d at 211-12; Nieman, 178 F.3d at 1129. Fur-
thermore, policy considerations alone are not enough to overcome the presump-
tion against extraterritoriality. See Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc'ns
Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1096 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[Tlhe ultimate touchstone of extraterri-
toriality consist[s] of an ascertainment of congressional intent; courts [do] not
rest solely on the consequences of a failure to give a statutory scheme extraterri-
torial application.").
20. E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991), superseded by statute
on other grounds, Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2006), as recog-
nized in Fray v. Omaha World Herald Co., 960 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir. 1992); see also
F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004) (comment-
ing that it is hoped that "the potentially conflicting laws of different nations [will]
work together in harmony" as a result of applying the presumption against extra-
territoriality and similar principles).
21. See Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1098; United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109
F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1997). Comity, however, is a separate rule of construction. It is
applicable even if a statute has no extraterritorial reach. See In re Maxwell
Commc'n Corp., 93 F.3d 1036, 1047 (2d Cir. 1996).
22. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895); see also In re Maxwell, 93 F.3d at 1048
("Comity is a doctrine that takes into account the interests of the United States,
the interests of the foreign state, and those mutual interests the family of nations
have in just and efficiently functioning rules of international law.").
23. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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exclusive Right to their respective ... Discoveries."24 The purposes of
U.S. patent law include encouraging and rewarding innovation, pro-
moting public disclosure of inventions, and ensuring that ideas in the
public domain remain available and free for public use.2 5 To achieve
these goals, U.S. patent law grants patent holders a statutory monop-
oly 26 which allows patent holders to commercialize their inventions
without competition. 27 The monopoly ends "20 years from the date on
which the application for the patent was filed in the United States."28
A U.S. patent authorizes its holder to not only make, use, and sell the
patented invention, but also to exclude others from performing these
activities. 29 As part of this authority, patent holders are empowered
by the Patent Act to bring infringement actions for activities that in-
trude upon their rights.30
Historically, patent holders' rights and protections have been lim-
ited to the geographical boundaries and jurisdictional limitations of
the U.S. by case law, statutes, and treaties. Even before Congress en-
acted section 154(a)(1) of the Patent Act, which codified the principle
that U.S. patent law is generally limited to the territorial jurisdiction
of the U.S.,3' courts applied the presumption against extraterritorial-
ity to limit the reach of U.S. patent law. 32 Furthermore, major intel-
lectual property treaties the U.S. has signed also reflect the idea of the
territoriality of patent law.33
24. Id.
25. Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 138 F.3d 277, 284 (7th Cir. 1998).
26. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
27. See William Greubel, Note, A Comedy of Errors: Defining 'Component' in a Global
Information Technology Market-Accounting for Innovation by Penalizing the In-
novators, 24 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 507, 511 (2006) ("Equally if not
more important, U.S. patent laws provide incentives for patent holders to com-
mercialize the claimed invention, method, assembly, or process.").
28. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).
29. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 135 (1969); see also
35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000).
30. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).
31. Id. § 154(a)(1).
32. See Zaunbrecher, supra note 3, at 33.
33. See id. at 37 ("As a general matter, [the treaties] supported the territoriality of
patent law by allowing member states to maintain additional standards so long
as such standards did not conflict with the provisions of the TRIPS agreement.");
see also Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, art. 1.1, Apr.
15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement] ("Members shall be free
to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this
Agreement within their own legal system and practice."); Paris Convention for
the Protection of Intellectual Property art. 2, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583 [here-
inafter Paris Convention] (recognizing that member nations will develop their
own patent systems by requiring that citizens of one signing country enjoy the
same patent rights in another signing country as that country's own citizens).
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The Supreme Court first applied the presumption against extrater-
ritoriality to U.S. patent law in 1856 in Brown v. Duchesne.34 Brown
involved a foreign ship docked in a U.S. port for commercial reasons.3 5
Before entering U.S. waters, the ship had been outfitted with a U.S.
patented invention to help it sail on the ocean.3 6 Once the ship was in
a U.S. port, the U.S. patent holder sued the ship master for patent
infringement because the invention was being used in the U.S.37
Even though a literal reading of the patent infringement statute sup-
ported the patent holder's position, the Court stressed that the resolu-
tion of the issue of liability "depend[ed] on the construction of the
patent laws."38 The Court emphasized that U.S. patent laws "do not,
and were not intended to, operate beyond the limits of the United
States; and as the patentee's right of property and exclusive use is
derived from them, they cannot extend beyond the limits to which the
law itself is confined."3 9 In support of its position, the Court compared
Congress' patent power to its treaty-making power, noting that they
are distinct powers that Congress usually exercises separately.4
0
Treaty-making power, which gives extraterritorial effect to laws,
should not be read into the patent power, which generally only applies
domestically.41 The Court said that this distinction was essential to
avoid a result that Congress could not have intended.42 For example,
had the ship master been found liable, U.S. patent holders would have
been able to hold a foreigner liable even if there was a U.S. treaty
absolving foreigners of liability for infringement when they enter the
country, severely weakening the treaty power of the U.S.43 Therefore,
the Court held that, despite the fact that part of the ship was patented
in the U.S., "the rights of property and exclusive use granted to a pat-
entee does [sic] not extend to a foreign vessel lawfully entering one of
34. 60 U.S. 183 (1856). See generally Katherine E. White, The Recent Expansion of
Extraterritoriality in Patent Infringement Cases, 2007 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 2, 11
n.33 ("It is worth noting that at the time of this decision, the boundaries of the
United States were not as well defined as they are today.").
35. Brown, 60 U.S. at 189-90.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 194 (emphasis added).
39. Id. at 195.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 197 ("We think these laws ought to be construed in the spirit in which they
were made-that is, as founded in justice-and should not be strained by techni-
cal constructions to reach cases which Congress evidently could not have contem-
plated without departing from the principle on which they were legislating, and
going far beyond the object they intended to accomplish.").
43. Id. at 197.
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our ports."4 4 The ship master would be liable only if he tried to resell
the invention in the U.S.45
In 1915, the Supreme Court affirmed the vital role of the presump-
tion against extraterritoriality in interpreting U.S. patent law. In
Dowagiac Manufacturing Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co., a U.S.
patent holder sought to collect damages from a Canadian reseller of its
patented invention. 46 The patented invention was an improvement on
a grain drill.4 7 The reseller purchased grain drills from an unautho-
rized supplier in the U.S. and resold them in Canada.48 The Court
held that the reseller was not liable for any of the products sold in
Canada because "[tihe right conferred by a patent under our law is
confined to the United States and its territories, and infringement of
this right cannot be predicated of acts wholly done in a foreign coun-
try."49 Relying on the presumption against extraterritoriality, the
Court quickly rejected the proposition that the Canadian reseller was
liable for patent infringement. 50
The presumption against extraterritoriality appeared again in
1972. In Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., the Supreme Court
reaffirmed that U.S. patent law was limited to the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the U.S.51 Additionally, before this case arose, Congress had
codified that U.S. patent law was subject to the presumption against
extraterritoriality in section 154(a)(1) of the Patent Act.5 2 In Deep-
south, the holder of a U.S. combination patent 5 3 for a shrimp deveiner
sued a U.S.-based exporter for infringement. 5 4 The exporter made all
of the components of the invention in the U.S. and then shipped the
components in separate boxes to locations outside the U.S. where they
44. Id. at 198.
45. Id. at 196 ("If it had been manufactured on her deck while she was lying in the
port of Boston, or if the captain had sold it there, he would undoubtedly have
trespassed upon the rights of the plaintiff, and would have been justly answera-
ble for the ... advantage he thereby obtained.").
46. 235 U.S. 641 (1915).
47. Id. at 650.
48. Id.
49. Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
50. Id.
51. 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
52. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000) (codified in 1952).
53. A combination patent, as defined by the court in Borden, Inc., v. Occidental Petro-
leum Corp., is:
[Olne in which none of the parts or components are new, and none are
claimed as new; nor is any portion of the combination less than the
whole claimed as new or stated to produce any given result. The combi-
nation, as arranged in reference to each other, is stated to be the im-
provement and the thing patented. It is a novel union of old means
designed to achieve new ends.
381 F. Supp. 1178, 1202 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
54. 406 U.S. at 519.
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were fully assembled and sold.55 The Court first found that a combi-
nation patent can only be infringed once the invention is fully assem-
bled.56 This invention, however, was fully assembled outside the
U.S.57 The Court further held that it was not infringement "to make
or use a patented product outside of the United States,"58 and, thus,
the exporter did not infringe the patent.59 In support of its holding,
the Court highlighted that "the wording of [the Patent Act] reveals a
Congressional intent" to have patent holders secure protection abroad
through foreign patents.60 Moreover, the Court underscored that it
would "require a clear and certain signal from Congress" before there
could be infringement of any kind for acts performed outside the
U.S.61
B. Congress Responds to Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram
Corp.
1. Section 271(9
Congress responded to Deepsouth by enacting section 271(f). Ac-
cording to the legislative history for the section, Congress "specifically
intended § 271(f) as a response to"62 Deepsouth to "close [the] loophole
in patent law" exposed by the case. 63 Section 271(f) provides the
following:
(1) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the
United States all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented in-
vention, where such components are uncombined in whole or in part, in such
manner as to actively induce the combination of such components outside of
the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combina-
tion occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer.
(2) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the
United States any component of a patented invention that is especially made
or especially adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or com-
modity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, where such
component is uncombined in whole or in part, knowing that such component is
so made or adapted and intending that such component will be combined
outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if
such combination occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an
infringer.
6 4
55. Id. at 523-24.
56. Id. at 528.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 527.
59. Id. at 532.
60. Id. at 531.
61. Id.
62. Fisch & Allen, supra note 12, at 565.
63. S. REP. No. 98-663 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5827, 5828.
64. 35 U.S.C. § 271(0 (2000) (emphasis added).
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Liability for infringement can arise under either subsection 271(f)(1)
or (2).65 For the purposes of this Note, the differences between the
subsections of section 271(0 are immaterial.
2. Patent Infringement Liability Under Section 271(t)
Courts have applied section 271(0 to patents for both mechanical
devices and methods.66 The most straightforward application of the
section is to patents for mechanical devices, 6 7 which was the type of
65. Id. Although Congress was responding to Deepsouth with section 271(f), Con-
gress extended liability slightly beyond the facts of Deepsouth. See Microsoft
Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746, 1760 n.18 (2007) ("While Deepsouth ex-
ported kits containing all the parts of its deveining machines, § 271(0(1) applies
to the supply abroad of 'all or a substantial portion of a patented invention's
components. And § 271(f)(2) applies to the export of even a single component if it
is 'especially made or especially adapted for use in the invention and not a staple
article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use.').
66. Fisch & Allen, supra note 12, at 567-73. Under the Patent Act, a person who
"invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or com-
position of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent therefor." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). The term "process" encompasses any
process, art, or method. Id. § 100(b). The term "machine" "includes every
mechanical device or combination of mechanical powers and devices to perform
some function and produce a certain effect or result." Coming v. Burden, 56 U.S.
(15 How.) 252, 267 (1853) (emphasis added). "A machine is a concrete thing, con-
sisting of parts, or of certain devices and combination of devices." Burr v. Duryee,
68 U.S. 531, 570 (1863). With process patents, "it is the manner of doing which
amounts to invention." With machine patents, "it is the instrumentality by
which the thing is done" which amounts to invention. Bauer Bros. Co. v. Boga-
lusa Paper Co., 96 F.2d 991, 994 (5th Cir. 1938). See Corning, 56 U.S. (15 How.)
at 267-68, which provides the following example to aid in distinguishing between
these kinds of patents:
A new [method] is usually the result of discovery; a machine, of inven-
tion. The arts of tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing
India rubber, smelting ores, and numerous others, are usually carried on
by [methods], as distinguished from machines. One may discover a new
and useful improvement in the process of tanning, dyeing, &c., irrespec-
tive of any particular form of machinery or mechanical device. And an-
other may invent a labor-saving machine by which this operation or
[method] may be performed, and each may be entitled to his patent. As,
for instance, A has discovered that by exposing India rubber to a certain
degree of heat, in mixture or connection with certain metallic salts, he
can produce a valuable product, or manufacture; he is entitled to a pat-
ent for his discovery, as a [method] . . ., irrespective of any machine or
mechanical device. B, on the contrary, may invent a new furnace or
stove, or steam apparatus, by which this process may be carried on with
much saving of labor, and expense of fuel; and he will be entitled to a
patent for his machine, as an improvement in the art. Yet A could not
have a patent for a machine, or B for a [method]; but each would have a
patent for the means or method of producing a certain result, or effect,
and not for the result or effect produced.
67. See Greubel, supra note 27, at 515. See also T.D. Williamson, Inc. v. Laymon, 723
F. Supp. 587, 590 (N.D. Okla. 1989) (finding that section 271(f) applied to a "cali-
per pig, used for measuring and reporting on internal geometry of pipelines").
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patent at issue in Deepsouth.68 Software, in contrast, is most often
protected by method patents. 69 Courts generally did not apply section
271(f) to method patents because they could not easily identify the
components of the method.70 While courts had established that a
component did not have to be patented and could even be a staple or
commodity,7 1 there was little additional guidance to determine what
the term "component" included. The definition of "component" has
been at the heart of the controversy surrounding the application of
section 271(f) to software. 7 2 In its 2005 decisions in Eolas Technolo-
gies Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.73 and AT & T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp.,74
the Federal Circuit "expand [ed] the scope and construction of the term
'component' as it is used in 271(f)" and applied the section to method
patents, which include many software patents.7
5
C. The Federal Circuit Extends Section 271(f) to Software
Exports
Software exported on golden master disks does not easily fit into
the structure of section 271(f). For this reason, controversy sur-
rounded the issue of whether U.S. software exporters could be liable
under the section.76 Specifically, the controversy focused on whether
68. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 519 (1972).
69. Fisch & Allen, supra note 12, at 571.
70. See Greubel, supra note 27, at 516; see also Enpat, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 6 F.
Supp. 2d 537 (E.D. Va. 1998) (finding that section 271(f) did not apply to sales of
software abroad where use of the software potentially infringed a method patent);
Aerogroup Int'l, Inc. v. Marlboro Footworks, Ltd., 955 F. Supp. 220, 231-32
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that section 271(f) did not apply to a design patent for a
shoe sole because there cannot be any "component parts"). But see W.R. Grace &
Co. v. Intercat, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 2d 316, 320 (D. Del. 1999) (finding that section
271(f) applied to a patent for a chemical composition).
71. T.D. Williamson, 723 F. Supp. at 592; see also David M. Wilson, The Golden
Master and the Horror of Extraterritoriality: AT & T v. Microsoft and the Spector
of Global Liability Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), 7 Hous. Bus. & TAx L.J. 424, 443
(2007) ("What constitutes a component? Mechanical parts, as considered in Deep.
south, have been unquestionably classified as components since the statute's first
applications. Courts have concluded that chemicals constitute components of
patented chemical compositions as well. Blueprints, paper, and glue are also
components of a patented form.").
72. See, e.g., AT & T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev'd,
127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007); Eolas Technologies Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325
(Fed. Cir. 2005).
73. 399 F.3d 1325.
74. 414 F.3d 1366.
75. See Greubel, supra note 27, at 516.
76. See, e.g., Brief of the Software & Information Industry Association as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746
(2007) (No. 05-1056), 2006 WL 3740362 (arguing that the broad interpretation of
section 271(f) exposes U.S. companies to excessive liability, harms the U.S. econ-
omy, and disrespects other nations and, thus, that the Federal Circuit should be
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software could be a component and, if so, whether companies supplied
software when they exported a golden master disk.77 These issues
were difficult because of the intangibility of software and the way it is
commonly distributed by software companies. 78 Companies export
software to foreign buyers in a manner that is significantly different
from how physical, tangible goods are exported. Instead of sending
the exact number of copies needed, exporters send the foreign buyers
the software code embedded on golden master disks. 7 9 The foreign
buyers then use the golden master disks to make the number of copies
they need.8 0 The potential infringement arises when the foreign buy-
ers use the foreign-made copies to "assemble [a] patented apparatus"
outside of the U.S.81
1. Eolas Technologies Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.: Software Is a
Component Under Section 271(f)
The Federal Circuit first held that software could be a component
of a patented invention, within the meaning of section 271(f), in Eolas
Technologies Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.82 Eolas sued Microsoft under sec-
tion 271(f) for infringement of its patent for a software product.8 3 Eo-
las' patented invention was software that allowed the "user to use a
reversed); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007) (No. 05-1056), 2006 WL
3693464 (arguing for reversal of the Federal Circuit because an expansive read-
ing of section 271(f) harms the competitiveness of U.S. companies and negatively
affects the harmony among the patent law systems of the United States and
other nations); Brief for Intellectual Property Professors as Amici Curiae in Sup-
port of Reversal, Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007) (No. 05-
1056), 2006 WL 3740618 (arguing for reversal of the Federal Circuit because the
decision was against the territorial limits of patent law and would disadvantage
U.S. software companies); Brief for U.S. Philips Corp. & Philips Electronics
North America Corp. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Microsoft Corp.
v. AT & T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007) (No. 05-1056), 2007 WL 197102 (arguing
that the Federal Circuit decision should be upheld because to do otherwise would
treat software companies differently from other companies); Brief for Wisconsin
Alumni Research Foundation, Research Corp. Technologies, Inc., & the Regents
of the University of California as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Microsoft
Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007) (No. 05-1056), 2007 WL 215264
(arguing that the Federal Circuit decision should be upheld because it properly
holds infringers liable for circumventing U.S. patent law).
77. See, e.g., AT & T Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 1746; Eolas Technologies
Inc., 399 F.3d 1325.
78. Fisch & Allen, supra note 12, at 574.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 574-75.
81. Id. at 575. This is the precise sequence of events that gave rise to the charge of
infringement in both Eolas Technologies Inc., 399 F.3d at 1331, and AT & T
Corp., 414 F.3d at 1752-53, rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 1746.
82. 399 F.3d 1325.
83. Id.
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web browser in a fully interactive environment."8 4 The invention
could only be infringed when the software code was executed by a com-
puter.8 5 Eolas alleged that Microsoft infringed its patent when it ex-
ported its Internet Explorer code with functionality covered by Eolas'
patent to foreign manufacturers on golden master disks and the man-
ufacturers used the master disks to install the code on computers for
sale outside the U.S.86 After finding that the Internet Explorer code
embedded on the master disks was a component of the patented inven-
tion under section 271(f), the Federal Circuit remanded the case for
final resolution.8 7 The court supported its position that the software
was a component by emphasizing that the legislative purpose of the
section was to close a loophole in patent law for exporting components
of patented inventions, regardless of whether the patented invention
or its components were tangible.8 8 Finally, the court noted that the
Internet Explorer code was more than "a prototype, mold, or detailed
set of instructions"8 9 because it "in effect drives the 'functional nu-
cleus of the finished computer product.'" 9 0
2. AT & T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp.: Software Exporter Liable
for Patent Infringement
The Federal Circuit again addressed liability for patent infringe-
ment under section 271(f) for exported software in AT & T Corp. v.
Microsoft Corp.9 1 AT & T held a patent for a computer that digitally
encoded and compressed recorded speech.9 2 However, when installed
on a computer, the Microsoft Windows operating system infringed on
AT & T's patent because it permitted the computer to process recorded
speech as defined in the patent.93 AT & T's patent, though, was in-
fringed only when Windows was installed on a computer. 94 Microsoft
sold Windows to foreign computer manufacturers for installation on
computers for sale exclusively outside of the U.S.95 Microsoft sent the
manufacturers the code on golden master disks or in encrypted elec-
84. Id. at 1328.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1329.
88. Id. at 1340.
89. Id. at 1339. The Federal Circuit held in Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., 375
F.3d 1113 (Fed. Cir. 2004), that, under section 271(f), instructions, templates,
plans, and designs used to create infringing products in foreign countries were
not components.
90. Eolas Technologies Inc., 399 F.3d at 1339 (quoting Imagexpo, L.L.C. v. Microsoft
Corp., 288 F. Supp. 2d 550, 553 (E.D. Va. 2003)).
91. 414 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007).
92. Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746, 1750 (2007).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1752-53.
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tronic transmissions from the U.S.96 The manufacturers then created
copies of the master disk or electronic transmission and used these
copies to install Windows on the computers. 97 Subsequently, AT & T
sued Microsoft for infringement under section 271(f) for these foreign
installations of Windows. 98 The Federal Circuit held that the Win-
dows code was a component under section 271(f).99 Furthermore, the
court held that providing a golden master disk to be reproduced for
installation is included within the phrase "supplie[d] . . . from the
United States," thus making Microsoft liable for infringement.100 In
support of its position that copying software was part of supplying
software, the court explained that copying was an ordinary and nor-
mal part of supplying software.1O' Following what it believed to be
Congressional intent, the Federal Circuit gave the section a broad ex-
traterritorial effect.10 2 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to re-
view the Federal Circuit's decision. 0 3
D. Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp.: The Supreme Court
Reverses the Federal Circuit
On appeal, the Supreme Court considered two issues that arose
from the facts in Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp. 10 4 The first issue
was whether the Windows software code, contained either on a golden
master disk or in an electronic transmission, was a component under
section 271(f).105 The second issue, which was closely related to the
first, was whether Microsoft supplied components of the foreign-made
computers, as required by section 271(f).106
AT & T maintained that the Windows code sent by Microsoft on
golden master disks or via electronic transmissions was a component
of its patented invention, even if it was not in a computer-readable
form.10 7 AT & T further argued that because the Windows code pro-
vided by Microsoft was a component used to make the patented inven-
tion outside of the U.S., Microsoft supplied components from the U.S.
and, therefore, was liable under section 271(f).108 Microsoft re-
96. Id. at 1753.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. AT & T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 127
S. Ct. 1746 (2007).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1370.
102. Id. at 1369-70.
103. Microsoft Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1753.
106. Id. at 1754.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1753. AT & T brought suit under section 271(f), but did not clearly indicate
whether the infringement arose under section 271(f)(1) or (2). Because the par-
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sponded that the Windows code was not a component of the patented
invention.' 0 9 It contended that the foreign-made copies of the code
that allowed the code to be installed on the foreign computers were the
components and that it was not liable because it did not supply the
foreign-made copies from the U.S.110 The Court agreed with Microsoft
and reversed the Federal Circuit's decision."' The Court found that
the foreign-made copies of Windows, not the code itself, were compo-
nents under section 271(f) and that Microsoft was not liable because it
did not "suppl[y] . .. from the United States" these foreign-made
copies. 1 1
2
The Supreme Court began its analysis by determining that a copy
of Windows in a computer-readable format, not the Windows code it-
self, was a component. 113 The Court defined software as the "set of
instructions, known as code, that directs a computer to perform speci-
fied functions or operations."114 Using this definition, the Court
stressed that software can be conceptualized either "in the abstract" or
as "a tangible copy."115 Software in the abstract is "the instructions
themselves detached from any medium" that would render it com-
puter readable.116 Additionally, tangible software is "the instructions
encoded on a [computer-readable] medium."117 The Court found this
distinction to be central to the determination of the case and held that
only the tangible foreign-made copies of the Windows code, not the
software on the master disks or in the electronic transmissions, were
components of the patented invention. 118
In reaching the conclusion that only the tangible copies of Windows
were components, the Court focused on the language of section 271(f)
and reasoned that liability attaches only when components supplied
from the U.S. can be combined to create the patented invention.119
Because Windows software in the abstract "cannot be inserted into a
ties did "not suggest that [the] differences are outcome determinative," the Court
chose to analyze the issue under section 271(f)(1). Id. at 1754 n.7.
109. Id. Microsoft did not argue that software could never be a component under sec-
tion 271(f). Id. at 1754.
110. Id. at 1753.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1757.
113. Id. at 1756.
114. Id. at 1754 (quoting Fantasy Sports Properties, Inc. v. Sportsline.com, Inc., 287
F.3d 1108, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. This assumes that the code embedded on the computer-readable medium is
object code. Object code is machine readable code. Source code is the code as
written by humans, which is used to generate object code. Id. at 1754 n.8.




[disk drive]" and "cannot be installed or executed on a computer,"i 20 it
cannot be combined to make the patented invention and does not fit
section 271(f)'s definition of a "component."' 2 ' Despite AT & T's argu-
ment that copying software is an easy step and should not matter, the
Court held that the act of copying the Windows software is an essen-
tial step because it makes the software a combinable component of the
patented invention.' 2 2 Additionally, the Court called into question
the Federal Circuit's holding in Eolas that software contained on a
golden master disk was a component. The Court, however, was "una-
ble to determine . . . whether the Federal Circuit panels in Eolas re-
garded as a component software in the abstract, or a copy of
software."' 23 Furthermore, the Court declined to address the issue of
whether software in the abstract could ever be a component, leaving
open the possibility that software exporters could still be liable for ex-
porting software on golden master disks under narrow facts.
124
In further support of its position on the component issue, the Court
compared Windows in the abstract to a blueprint "for the construction
and combination of the components of a patented device, [which] is not
itself a combinable component of that device."' 2 5 The Court cited Pel-
legrini v. Analog Devices, Inc.126 in which the Federal Circuit held
that instructions cannot be a component under section 271(f).127 On
this point, the Court emphasized that "Congress . . . [could] have in-
cluded within § 271(f)'s compass ... not only combinable 'components'
of a patented invention, but also 'information, instructions, or tools
from which those components readily may be generated.' It did
not."'128
Having resolved the component issue, the Court next addressed
whether Microsoft supplied these components from the U.S. It held
that Microsoft did not "suppl[y] ... from the United States" the copies
of Windows installed on the computers because the foreign-made cop-
120. Id.
121. Id. In addressing whether software could be a component under section 271(f),
the court first had to determine the meaning of 'component." To do this, it ap-
plied a general rule of statutory construction that words in a statute will be given
their "ordinary or natural meaning." Id. (quoting FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471,
476 (1995)). The dictionary definition of"component" is "a constituent part," "ele-
ment," or "ingredient." Id. at 1755 n.ll (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 466 (Philip B. Grove et al. eds.,
1981)).
122. Id. at 1756.
123. Id. at 1754 n.10
124. Id. at 1756 n.13.
125. Id. at 1755.
126. 375 F.3d 1113 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
127. Microsoft Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1755.
128. Id. at 1756.
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ies were "'supplie[d]' from places outside the United States."129 Addi-
tionally, the Court rejected the Federal Circuit's position that "for
software 'components' the act of copying is subsumed in the act of 'sup-
plying.'"130 The Court stressed that copying is separate and apart
from supplying, regardless of how easy something is to reproduce.131
The Court next noted the importance of the presumption against
extraterritoriality.13 2 Because of the application of the presumption,
there generally is no liability for manufacturing or selling a patented
product outside the U.S.133 Congress, however, expressly made sec-
tion 271(f) an exception to this presumption, overcoming the presump-
tion in most cases. 134 Despite this exception, the Court underscored
that the presumption against extraterritoriality still "remains instruc-
tive in determining the extent of the statutory exception."135 Addition-
ally, the Court considered a related rule of statutory construction that
"assume [s] that legislators take account of the legitimate sovereign in-
terests of other nations when they write American laws."136 One such
legitimate sovereign interest noted by the Court is that "foreign law
'may embody different policy judgments about the relative rights of
inventors, competitors, and the public in patented inventions."'1 37
This rule of construction combined with the presumption against ex-
traterritoriality encouraged the Court to find that a narrow interpre-
129. Id. (second alteration in original).
130. Id. (citing AT & T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007)); see AT & T Corp., 414 F.3d at 1373-74 (Rader, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the Federal Circuit's holding was technology dependent,
in violation of precedent in Eolas requiring that all technology be treated the
same under section 271(f)); Eolas Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d
1325, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("Patents shall be available and patent rights enjoya-
ble without discrimination as to the place of invention [or] the field of technology
... .") (quoting TRIPS Agreement, supra note 33, Part II, § 5).
131. The Court explained:
But the extra step is what renders the software a usable, combinable
part of a computer; easy or not, the copy-producing step is essential.
Moreover, many tools may be used easily and inexpensively to generate
the parts of a device. A machine for making sprockets might be used by a
manufacturer to produce tens of thousands of sprockets an hour. That
does not make the machine a 'component' of the tens of thousands of
devices in which the sprockets are incorporated, at least not under any
ordinary understanding of the term 'component'.
Microsoft Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1756.
132. Id. at 1758.
133. Id. at 1750.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1758 (emphasis in original).
136. Id.
137. Id. (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,




tation of section 271(f) was necessary despite the intent of Congress to
give the section extraterritorial reach.13s
Finally, the Court emphasized that it was properly left to Congress
to take further action. It disagreed with the Federal Circuit's position
that section 271(f) should be broadly interpreted to encompass chang-
ing technology to close up the new "loophole" evident in this case.
139
The Court concluded that "focused legislative consideration" is a bet-
ter way of adjusting U.S. patent law "for the realities of software dis-
tribution."140 The Court, therefore, left it to Congress to decide
whether to change U.S. patent law to create liability in this type of
situation.
III. ANALYSIS
In Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., the Supreme Court correctly
overturned a controversial decision by the Federal Circuit.141 Al-
though Congress should maintain patent infringement liability for ex-
ports under section 271(f), it should not react to this decision as it did
to the Court's decision in Deepsouth.142 Congress should not enact
new legislation directed at imposing patent infringement liability for
software exported using golden master disks because the law would
contravene the principles underlying the presumption against extra-
territoriality, expose software exporters to excessive levels of liability,
and ignore the options U.S. patent holders have to secure protection of
their rights outside the U.S.
A. Congress Should Not Impose Patent Infringement
Liability for Software Exported on Golden Master Disks
1. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Counsels Against
Imposing Patent Infringement Liability
If Congress enacts legislation that would potentially hold U.S.
software exporters liable for patent infringement when they export
software on golden master disks, it would impose liability for foreign
actions and reach too far into the domain of other nations. This result
would be contrary to the principles underlying the presumption
against extraterritoriality. These underlying principles are respect
for other nations, or comity,14 3 and harmony among intellectual prop-
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1759 ("The 'loophole,' in our judgment, is properly left for Congress to con-
sider, and to close if it finds such action warranted.").
140. Id. at 1760 (citing AT & T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir.
2005), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007)).
141. Id.
142. See Fisch & Allen, supra note 12, at 565.
143. See discussion supra subsection II.A.1. Comity could also be viewed as "re-
fraining from extraterritorial application of laws in an act of 'altruistic deference
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erty laws of all nations.'44 Ultimately, the presumption "serves to
protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of
other nations which could result in international discord."'145 A law
directed at software exports would focus on actions that occur entirely
outside the U.S.,146 which would be different from the focus of section
271(f). As it is currently interpreted by the Supreme Court, section
271(f) is aimed at the U.S.-based activity of supplying.147 In Microsoft
Corp. v. AT & T Corp., Microsoft also supplied golden master disks
containing its Windows software to other companies in the U.S. to
copy and install on computers to be sold inside the U.S., which clearly
infringed on AT & T's patent.148 In that situation, Microsoft was held
liable for actions that occurred exclusively inside the U.S. where AT &
T's patent was in effect. 14 9 However, under a law directed at exported
software, U.S. exporters would be liable even though the actions of
... [to] a superior foreign interest.'" Paul Margulies, What's All the Fuss? The
'Parade of Horribles' When Applying 35 U.S.C. § 271(0 to Software Patents, 14
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 481, 496 (2006) (quoting Curtis A. Bradley, Territo-
rial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, VA. J. INT'L L. 505, 515
(1997)).
144. See discussion supra subsection II.A.1. Although the Paris Convention and
TRIPS Agreement encourage member nations to develop their own intellectual
property law systems, they also provide a set of guidelines that member nations
must follow to reduce the possibility of conflict among the various intellectual
property law systems. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 33; Paris Convention,
supra note 33.
145. E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991), superseded by statute
on other grounds, Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2006), as recog-
nized in Fray v. Omaha World Herald Co., 960 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir. 1992); see also
Margulies, supra note 142, at 499-500 ("Overall, the presumption may help im-
prove international cooperation on intellectual property issues.").
146. See Margulies, supra note 143, at 484 ("The application of § 271(f) to software, an
easily transported and duplicated invention, presents interesting questions of
territoriality. The United States seemingly allows patent holders to seek dam-
ages for actions that completely occur abroad, outside of the reach of traditional
applications of domestic law.").
147. See Wilson, supra note 71, at 452; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 29, Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 127 S. Ct.
1746 (2007) (No. 05-1056), 2006 WL 3693464 ("When [section 271(f)] is read cor-
rectly to regulate only the supply of components from the United States for as-
sembly abroad, it has no direct extraterritorial application."); Donald S. Chisum,
Normative and Empirical Territoriality in Intellectual Property: Lessons from
Patent Law, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 603, 607 (1997) (suggesting that in section 271(f)
"Congress did not extend patent rights to acts outside the United States, but
rather relied on some domestic act as a hook to reach foreign-based economic
activity that harms a patent owner's interest in deriving full economic advantage
from the U.S. market").
148. See Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746, 1753 & nn.5, 6 (2007) (not-
ing that Microsoft stipulated that it was liable under section 271(a) and section
271(b) for domestic infringement).
149. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).
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copying, installing, and selling that ultimately give rise to the in-
fringement would take place entirely in a foreign country.
By enacting a law directed at wholly foreign actions, Congress
would reach too far into the affairs of other nations in light of the pur-
poses of the presumption against extraterritoriality to respect the le-
gal systems of other nations and avoid international conflict.150 The
U.S. law would dangerously ignore the interests of the foreign country
where the activities occur 15 1 by conspicuously intruding on the rights
of that country to regulate its own intellectual property law system. 152
While U.S. patent laws that are limited to the territorial jurisdiction
of the U.S. will affect a foreign country's patent law power to some
extent, U.S. laws should not directly regulate activities that are
wholly foreign because that would usurp some of the foreign country's
power, and possibly lead to discord between the U.S. and the foreign
country. 1 53 Consequently, even though Congress has the power to en-
act a statute directed at software exports, 154 the policy concerns un-
derlying the presumption against extraterritoriality caution against
the passage of such a law.
2. Patent Infringement Liability Would Be Excessive
Furthermore, Congress should not enact legislation directed at
software exports because the potential patent infringement liability
would be too great for U.S. companies. The excessive liability would
150. See supra subsection II.A.1; see also Brief for the United States at Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 29, Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746
(2007) (No. 05-1056), 2006 WL 3693464 ("Imposing liability for conduct that oc-
curs in foreign countries and is directed toward foreign markets fully implicates
the comity concerns underlying the presumption against extraterritoriality.").
151. See Wilson, supra note 71, at 434 (suggesting that a law directed as software
exports would "show[ I] an inappropriate lack of respect for foreign patent laws").
152. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 33 (providing for a basic common intellectual
property law system where member nations define the rest of their system based
on their own policies); Paris Convention, supra note 33 (setting basic intellectual
property law guidelines for all member nations, but otherwise allowing member
nations to define their own intellectual property law systems); see also RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 206 & cmt.b (1987) (providing that a
state has "sovereignty over its territory" where sovereignty "implies a state's law-
ful control over its territory generally to the exclusion of other states, authority to
govern in that territory, and authority to apply law there"); Margulies, supra note
143, at 496-97 (noting that because intellectual property is important to domestic
economies "jurisdiction sometimes should not exist over issues 'so closely tied to
foreign sovereignty interests.'") (quoting Graeme W. Austin, The Role of National
Courts: Valuing "Domestic Self-Determination" in International Intellectual Prop-
erty Jurisprudence, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1155, 1179 (2002)).
153. See Margulies, supra note 143, at 501 ("[Ihfthe U.S. government reaches so far to
protect domestic industry, it may find other nations respond in kind. U.S. patent
holders could find themselves liable in foreign courts for infringing domestic con-
duct and international negotiations could break down.").
154. See supra subsection II.A.1.
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potentially encourage software developers to move production offshore
to avoid the added liability and remain competitive in foreign mar-
kets. Section 284 of the Patent Act governs the award of damages for
patent infringement. 1 55 It provides that "the court shall award [the
patent holder] damages adequate to compensate for the infringement,
but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the
invention by the infringer."1 5 6 Damages are adequate if they are "full
compensation for 'any damages' [the patent holder] suffered as a re-
sult of the infringement."1 5 7 In addition, damages must be based on
the patent holder's actual pecuniary loss as a result of the infringe-
ment.1 58 Under these general damages rules, the patent infringement
liability for software exported using golden master disks could be ex-
orbitant. Unlike in the manufacturing context where the manufac-
turer's liability for infringement under section 271(f) is ultimately
limited by the number of components supplied,1 59 the software ex-
porter's liability is potentially boundless because software is easily
copied. 160 Thus, this law would "convert[ ] a single act of supply from
the United States into a springboard for liability each time a copy of
the software is subsequently made [abroad] and combined with com-
puter hardware [abroad] for sale [abroad]. "161 With damages based
on the patent holder's actual monetary losses attributable to infringe-
ment, the software exporter's liability would increase every time the
foreign company made another copy of the software, installed the
software, and sold the resulting computer system.1 62
155. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
156. Id.
157. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 654 (1983).
158. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 507 (1964).
159. It is worth noting that in Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp. the Supreme Court
declined to address whether Microsoft would be liable under section 271(f) if it
produced the copies in the U.S. and then sent the copies overseas to be used to
install the software. 127 S. Ct. 1746, 1757 n.14 (2007). This leaves open the
possibility that software exporters are still liable; however, the exporters' liability
would be limited to the number of copies supplied, as in the manufacturing
context.
160. See AT & T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Rader,
J., dissenting) ("[Slupplying a single 'component' of a patented invention from the
United States gives rise to endless liability in the United States under § 271(f) for
products manufactured entirely abroad."), revd, 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007).
161. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 29,
Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007) (No. 05-1056), 2006 WL
3693464.
162. In Eolas Technologies inc. v. Microsoft Corp., Microsoft's liability for infringe-
ment totaled $520 million, of which more than 64% was due to foreign sales. The
damages awarded because of section 271(f0 were far greater than those awarded
for domestic infringement. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Microsoft Corp. v.
Eolas Technologies Inc., 126 S. Ct. 568 (2005) (No. 05-288), 2005 WL 2132316.
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If companies could infringe on a U.S. patent when they export
software on master disks from the U.S., there would be an incentive to
relocate operations from the U.S. to foreign countries to circumvent
the potential liability.163 Software companies face fewer barriers to
relocating than manufacturing companies because they depend prima-
rily on human and technology resources that are readily available in
many countries. For example, India and other countries have culti-
vated technology-friendly environments and have workers with the
skills software companies require. 164 Manufacturing companies, on
the other hand, typically are more limited in where they can locate
production facilities because they may need to be near a natural re-
source or an important supplier. Unlike manufacturing companies,
software companies would be less likely to face the increased distribu-
tion costs associated with relocation because software can be sent us-
ing electronic transmissions. These differences lower the barrier for
software companies to relocate outside the U.S., making it more likely
that they will do so when confronted with the prospect of excessive
liability for patent infringement. When Congress enacted section
271(f), it hoped the section would be instrumental in reducing the
movement of manufacturing jobs offshore.165 If Congress is still con-
163. See AT & T Corp., 414 F.3d at 1372 (Rader, J., dissenting) (noting that Microsoft
warned that opening this box would lead to companies exporting jobs from this
country to avoid liability). But see id. (Lourie, J.) (rejecting Microsoft's argument
that holding it liable under section 271(f) would encourage software development
companies to move their operations offshore). See generally James R. Farrand,
Territoriality and Incentives Under the Patent Laws: Overreaching Harms U.S.
Economic and Technological Interests, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1215, 1250 (2006)
("While Pellegrini and a few similar decisions recognized limitations on the appli-
cation of Section 271(f), the nature of those limitations underscores-indeed
strengthens-the perverse incentives Section 271(f) creates against investing in
productive facilities in the United States and in favor of moving U.S. jobs and
technology to other countries."); Ari Rafilson, Note, Microsoft Liable for Patent
Infringement of Software Installed Overseas, 10 COMPUTER L. REV. & TECH. J.
219, 227 (2006) ("Apparently fearing further negative effects on the economy, sev-
eral corporations proposed the "Coalition Print" calling for a complete repeal of
Section 271(f).').
164. See Microsoft Signs Deals with Wipro, Infosys for Software in India, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 16, 2004, at B11, available at 2004 WLNR 10637314 ("Microsoft Corp has
signed software partnerships with Indian outsourcing companies Wipro Ltd and
Infosys Technologies Ltd, stepping up plans to hire more programmers in India
... ."); Microsoft Targets India in $1.7 Billion Expansion, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8,
2005, available at 2005 WLNR 19723224 (reporting that Microsoft unveiled plans
to invest $1.7 billion in India and hire 3,000 workers). But see Study Plays Down
Export of Computer Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2006, at Cll, available at 2006
WLNR 3114742 (reporting on a study showing that outsourcing of software devel-
opment has been exaggerated, with "the study group [finding] that the most
likely prognosis for the United States would be that 2 percent to 3 percent of the
jobs in information technology would go offshore annually over the next decade or
so").
165. See Wilson, supra note 71, at 453.
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cerned with reducing the loss of jobs to foreign countries, the new leg-
islation aimed at software exports would be contrary to this objective,
especially because U.S. software companies sell a large amount of
software outside of the U.S.166
U.S. software companies would also likely consider relocating so
they could avoid the strategic disadvantage created by the potential
excessive liability. While U.S.-based companies competing in foreign
markets with foreign-based competitors would be subject to this addi-
tional liability for actions outside the U.S., their foreign competitors
would not. This would clearly put the U.S. companies at a disadvan-
tage in the foreign market. 16 7 The patent infringement damages rules
make it very likely that software companies would face potentially un-
limited liability under legislation aimed at software exported on
golden master disks. The excessive liability combined with reduced
competitiveness in foreign markets would likely prompt U.S.-based
software companies to consider moving their production operations
outside of the U.S.
3. U.S. Patent Holders Should Seek Protection Under Foreign
Patent Law Systems
Although it may seem unfair to U.S. patent holders if Congress did
not respond to the Supreme Court's decision in Microsoft Corp. v. AT
& T Corp., Congress would be making the correct decision. In most
cases, U.S. patent law should provide patent holders with the tools
necessary to enforce their rights, increasing the incentive to invent;
however, Congress should not provide for liability where the benefits
of the law would be greatly outweighed by its detriments.168 The neg-
166. See H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 109TH CONG., COMMITTEE PRINT REGARDING
PATENT QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 144 (Comm. Print 2005), available at http://judici-
ary.house.gov/media/pdfs/printers/109th/20709.pdf (statement of Nathan P.
Myhrvold, Chief Executive Officer, Intellectual Ventures) (telling the subcommit-
tee that "[miost software companies have the majority of their revenue come from
outside the US .... ").
167. See AT & T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Rader,
J., dissenting) (finding that § 271(f), as interpreted by the Federal Circuit, not
only "protects foreign markets from domestic competitors," but also protect[s] for-
eign markets from foreign competitors); see generally Farrand, supra note 163, at
1266 (discussing the "paradox of significant added risks without any significant
protection [that] results from Section 271(f)'s applicability only against U.S. pro-
ducers" because it "leaves all actual and potential foreign producers free to com-
pete with the patent holder in foreign markets" but "does not, however, reduce
the monetary or injunctive burdens Section 271(f) can impose on companies that
do produce components in the U.S. and export their products to other countries").
168. The prevailing justification of patent law is that a patent is a "discretionary act of
the sovereign, acting on behalf of the public." 1 R. CARL MOY, MOY'S WALKER ON
PATENTS § 1:26 (4th ed. 2006). Under this view, "[wlhere it seems that the public
would suffer net losses ... the patent is denied." Id. The "grant of patent rights
is a discretionary act" by the sovereign that "exercises this discretion according to
2008]
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ative effects include the possible encroachment on rights of other na-
tions, which could affect international relations,16 9 and the potential
excessive liability imposed on software exporters, which could per-
suade software companies to move operations outside of the U.S.170
On the other hand, such a law would likely increase the incentive to
inventl 7 l because it would provide an additional layer of protection for
U.S. patents.1
72
U.S. patent holders, however, can generally secure protection
under foreign patent systems. 173 This is an approach endorsed by in-
ternational intellectual property treaties signed by the U.S.174 that
allow U.S. citizens to seek protection through foreign patent law sys-
tems.175 Although it is more expensive to apply for and protect pat-
its calculation of how best to increase society's welfare." Id. § 1:29. Additionally,
society's welfare is measured in economic terms, "with the goal of the patent sys-
tem said to be the maximization of society's aggregate wealth." Id. § 1:29. Ulti-
mately, the determination of whether there should be a patent right is based on a
balancing test. The benefits should be weighed against the drawbacks. Id. As
far as patent law is concerned, the desired benefit of conferring patent rights is
"the increased incentive to invent." Id. § 1:36.
169. See discussion supra subsection III.A.1.
170. See discussion supra subsection III.A.2.
171. See discussion supra note 165.
172. See Wilson, supra note 71, at 454 ("The Federal Circuit's decision in AT & T v.
Microsoft . . .greatly enhances the value of American software patents by ex-
tending liability of U.S. software manufacturers to include activities conducted in
foreign countries.").
173. Countries offer varied levels of patent protection. See, e.g., European Patent Of-
fice, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.epo.org/help/faq.html (last visited
Mar. 11, 2008); Japan Patent Office, Overview of Rights, http://www.jpo.go.jp/
seido e/index.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2007). Also, foreign patent rights may be
weaker than U.S. rights. See Margulies, supra note 143, at 507.
174. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 33, at 1197 ("Desiring to reduce distortions
and impediments to international trade, and taking into account the need to pro-
mote effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights, and to en-
sure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not
themselves become barriers to legitimate trade[,]" the member nations agreed to
uniform recognition of intellectual property rights.); Paris Convention, supra note
33 (recognizing that citizens of signing countries shall enjoy the same patent
rights in another signing country as that country's own citizens). The Supreme
Court also encourages the use of foreign protection where domestic protection is
not available. See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531
(1972) ("To the degree that the inventor needs protection in markets other than
those of this country, the wording of 35 U.S.C. §§ 154 and 271 reveals a congres-
sional intent to have him seek it abroad through patents secured in countries
where his goods are being used."); Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 127 S. Ct.
1746, 1759 (2007) ("In short, foreign law alone, not United States law, currently
governs the manufacture and sale of components of patented inventions in for-
eign countries. If AT & T desires to prevent copying in foreign countries, its rem-
edy today lies in obtaining and enforcing foreign patents.").
175. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 33; Paris Convention, supra note 33. In addi-
tion to filing in the country in which patent protection is desired, patent appli-
cants who are citizens of nations that are signatories of the Paris Convention can
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ents in multiple countries, 176 U.S. patent holders can choose to target
key markets where infringement is likely to occur and streamline the
process by filing an international patent application under the Patent
Cooperative Treaty.17 7 Furthermore, U.S. patent holders would bene-
fit from securing foreign protection because it would likely be more
expansive than the protection provided by a statute imposing liability
solely on U.S. software exporters. Foreign protection would give the
patent holder rights against foreign infringers with no connection to
the U.S. It would also allow U.S. patent holders to secure priority in
the foreign country, preventing foreign competitors from seeking such
protection and effectively shutting the U.S. patent holder out of com-
peting in that market. 178 On balance, Congress should not implement
the law because the potentially excessive liability imposed on export-
ers and incentive for software companies to relocate outside the U.S.
would strongly outweigh the potential benefits of providing limited ad-
ditional protection to U.S. patent holders for activities that occur
outside of the U.S.
B. Section 271(f) Should Be Maintained
Even though the Supreme Court has limited the reach of section
271(f),179 the section should remain in effect.1so The reach of the sec-
file one application to apply for a patent in all member nations. World Intellec-
tual Property Organization, Paris Cooperation Treaty, http://www.wipo.intlpct/
enltreaty/about.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2008). The international application
under the Patent Cooperation Treaty is simpler and less expensive than filing in
several different countries. An applicant can apply for a patent in some or all of
the 125 member countries. World Intellectual Property Org. [WIPO], Protecting
Your Inventions Abroad: Frequently Asked Questions About the Patent Coopera-
tion Treaty, Publ'n No. 433(E) (2006), available at http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/
basic facts/faqs-about-thepct.pdf.
176. Although there are strong policy concerns that weigh against enacting legislation
aimed at software exports, the "individual patent holder" would likely prefer to
have a right granted under U.S. patent law because of "practical considera-
tion[s]." Margulies, supra note 143, at 508. The practical considerations of rely-
ing on foreign countries to protect patent rights include the expense of litigating
in a foreign country, the strength of the foreign patent system in enforcing the
patent holder's rights, and the bias the foreign country may have against foreign
patent holders. Margulies, supra, note 143, at 507-08.
177. See Farrand, supra note 163, at 1264 ("Applying for patents in multiple countries
has been streamlined by the Patent Cooperation Treaty ("PCT"), sponsored by
the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO"), which boasts the United
States and 132 other countries as parties."); see also sources cited supra note 174.
178. See sources cited supra note 173.
179. See Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007).
180. Some authorities have argued for repeal of 271(f) for economic reasons. See
Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 2795, the "Patent Act of 2005":
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 8 (2005) (statement of Emery Simon,
Counsel, Business Software Alliance), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/
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tion is now properly restricted to situations where the parts supplied
from the U.S. are directly used to assemble the patented invention, as
in Deepsouth.l8 ' When limited to these situations, the section does
not have an unwarranted extraterritorial reach because it is imposing
liability for actions that occur in the U.S., not in foreign countries.' 8 2
The U.S., as sovereign, is the proper governmental body to control ac-
tions in the U.S., but it is not the proper body to address actions that
take place in other countries. 8 3 Additionally, section 271(f), as it is
now interpreted, does not impose excessive liability on U.S. exporters
in an overzealous effort to protect the rights of U.S. patent holders.
The liability is not disproportionate because the exporter's liability is
limited by the number of components the exporter supplies from the
U.S. and cannot be increased beyond this limit by the independent
actions of the exporter's foreign counterparts.' 8 4 Consequently, sec-
tion 271(f) should be maintained because it protects the rights of U.S.
patent holders without overreaching.
media/pdfs/printers/109th/23434.pdf ("[Section 271(f)] creates an unintended in-
centive to move valuable development activity outside the U.S., and should be
removed from the law."); Donald S. Chisum, Reforming Patent Law Reform, 4 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 336, 347 (2005) ("Section 271(f) is bad policy
because it punishes those who produce components domestically and exports [sic]
them and rewards those who move all production off shore.").
181. See, e.g., Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register, 144 F. Supp. 2d 188, 195
(W.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding defendant infringed under section 271(f) on plaintiffs
patent for a type of two-way C-fold mailer "when they brought the necessary pa-
per, glue, and blueprints with them from the United States"); W.R. Grace & Co. v.
Intercat, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 2d 316, 320 (D. Del. 1999) (finding that section 271(f)
applies to any patented invention, including chemical composition patents, and,
therefore, that the defendant was liable for international sales of its product that
was to be combined with the purchaser's product to create the patented chemical
composition); T.D. Williamson, Inc. v. Laymon, 723 F. Supp. 587, 593 (N.D. Okla.
1989) (finding the defendant liable for patent infringement under section 271(f)
for shipping "all components of [the defendant's] infringing pig, except the sen-
sory fingers, from Tulsa to Venezuela" where they were to be combined with the
sensory fingers "for a caliper pig survey of a pipeline").
182. See Wilson, supra note 71, at 452 ("[T]he legislative history supports the proposi-
tion that § 271(f) targets only activities within the United States and evidences
no congressional intent toward extraterritorial effect .... [Diomestic creation of
components with the intention that they be assembled abroad infringes the pat-
ent. The domestic actions, not the foreign actions, are the focus of the statute,
and the domestic actions trigger liability. This view of congressional purpose
comports well with the plain meaning of'supplies in or from the United States.'").
183. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 206 (1987) ("Under inter-
national law, a state has ... sovereignty over its territory and general authority
over its nationals .... ").
184. The determination of damages under the "lost profits" approach depends on how
many of the patented inventions, containing the "components" exported from the
U.S., were sold overseas. Accordingly, the amount of"lost profits" is closely tied
to the number of components exported. See W.R. Grace, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 322-26.
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IV. CONCLUSION
As it did in 1972 in Deepsouth, the Supreme Court, in Microsoft
Corp. v. AT & T Corp., limited the applicability of the U.S. patent law
to the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. because Congress had not
clearly provided otherwise. In Deepsouth, a U.S. exporter successfully
circumvented U.S. patent laws by shipping all the components of a
patent invention outside of the U.S. in separate boxes for assembly
and sale in foreign countries. To prevent similar future avoidance of
patent infringement liability, Congress enacted section 271(f), which
provided that U.S. exporters would be liable for supplying components
of a patented invention from the U.S. Companies commonly export
software from the U.S. using golden master disks that contain the
software code. The foreign buyers then use the master disks to create
copies of the software that can be used to install the software on com-
puters. The golden master disks are generally only used to transfer
copies of the software onto other computer-readable media and not to
install the software on computers. In 2006, the Federal Circuit found
Microsoft liable for patent infringement under section 271(f) in AT &
T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp. The court held that golden master disks
containing Windows code exported by Microsoft from the U.S. were
components of a speech processor patented by AT & T and that
Microsoft had supplied components of a patented invention from the
U.S. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision.
The Court disagreed with the Federal Circuit that the software sup-
plied on the golden master disks was a component within the meaning
of section 271(f). It found that only the foreign-made copies were com-
ponents. Because Microsoft had not supplied the foreign-made copies
from the U.S., it was not liable for patent infringement under section
271(f). The Court emphasized that the decision of whether to create
patent infringement liability for software exported using golden
master disks was properly left to Congress.
Congress, through, should not respond to Microsoft Corp. v. AT &
T Corp. with new legislation that imposes liability. Legislation that
creates patent infringement liability for software exported using
golden master disks would be more harmful than beneficial. Although
such legislation would offer an additional layer of protection for U.S.
patent holders, it would overreach into the domain of other nations,
excessively penalize exporters, and ignore the options currently avail-
able to U.S. patent holders to obtain protection in foreign jurisdic-
tions. As a result of Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., section 271(f) is
now properly focused on actions in the U.S. and does not mandate un-
reasonable liability for exported software. Congress is the final au-
thority on the extraterritorial reach of U.S. patent law, but it should
not overreach by enacting legislation aimed at software exported on
golden master disks.
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